Gilbert Harman has argued that it does not make sense to ascribe character traits to people. The notion of morally virtuous character becomes particularly suspect. How plausible this is depends on how broad character traits would have to be. Views of character as entirely invariant behavioural tendencies offer a soft target. This paper explores a view that is a less easy target: character traits as specific to kinds of situation, and as involving probabilities or real possibilities. Such ascriptions are not (...) undermined by Harman's arguments, and it remains plausible that the agent's character often is indispensable in explanation of behaviour. Character is indispensable also as processes of control that impose reliability where it really matters. (shrink)

The two contrasting theoretical approaches to visual perception, the constructivist and the ecological, are briefly presented and illustrated through their analyses of space and size perception. Earlier calls for their reconciliation and unification are reviewed. Neurophysiological, neuropsychological, and psychophysical evidence for the existence of two quite distinct visual systems, the ventral and the dorsal, is presented. These two perceptual systems differ in their functions; the ventral system's central function is that of identification, while the dorsal system is mainly engaged in (...) the visual control of motor behavior. The strong parallels between the ecological approach and the functioning of the dorsal system, and between the constructivist approach and the functioning of the ventral system are noted. It is also shown that the experimental paradigms used by the proponents of these two approaches match the functions of the respective visual systems. A dual-process approach to visual perception emerges from this analysis, with the ecological-dorsal process transpiring mainly without conscious awareness, while the constructivist-ventral process is normally conscious. Some implications of this dual-process approach to visual-perceptual phenomena are presented, with emphasis on space perception. Key Words: constructivist; dual-process approach; ecological; size perception; space perception; two visual systems; visual perception theories. (shrink)

Feinberg is one of the leading philosophers of law of the last forty years. This volume collects recent articles, both published and unpublished, on what he terms "basic questions" about the law, particularly in regard to the relationship to morality. Accessibly and elegantly written, this volume's audience will reflect the diverse nature of Feinberg's own interests: scholars in philosophy of law, legal theory, and ethical and moral theory.

In this paper, I outline two strands of evidence for the conclusion that the dynamical approach to cognitive science both seeks and provides covering law explanations. Two of the most successful dynamical models—Kelso’s model of rhythmic finger movement and Thelen et al.’s model of infant perseverative reaching—can be seen to provide explanations which conform to the famous explanatory scheme first put forward by Hempel and Oppenheim. In addition, many prominent advocates of the dynamical approach also express the provision of this (...) kind of explanation as a goal of dynamical cognitive science. I conclude by briefly outlining two consequences. First, dynamical cognitive science’s explanatory style may strengthen its links to the so-called “situated” approach to cognition, but, secondly, it may also undermine the widespread intuition that dynamics is related to emergentism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This article sets out a few key questions, themes, and problems animating an Azanian social and political philosophy, with specific reference to the radical promise of undoing South African disciplinary knowledges. The article is made up of two parts: The first part discusses the epistemic and political forces arrayed against black radical thought in South Africa and beyond. A few current trends of anti-black thinking – liberal racism, Left Eurocentrism, and postcolonial post-racialism – which pose challenges for the legibility of (...) Azanian critique are outlined. Part two constructs an exposition and synthesis of key tenets of Azanian thinking elaborated upon under three signs: ‘South Africa’, ‘race and racism’, and ‘Africa’. The aim of the discussion is to illustrate the critical, emancipatory potential of Azanian thought and its radical incommensurability with dominant strands of scholarship in the human and social sciences today. The article ultimately defends the reassertion of black radical thought in the South African academy today and underscores in particular the abolitionist drive of Azanian political thought. (shrink)

The conceptual gambit of this article is to propose that the notion of anti-entropy should be complemented by that of exergy investment or destruction, a term first proposed by Zoran Rant in 1956. It argues that one of Bernard Stiegler’s most important interventions into deconstruction is the thermodynamic reformulation of Derridean différance. I argue that we should view the idea of anti-entropy as likewise the displacement of entropy to an external system. With the notion of exergy, it becomes possible to (...) outline an economics of exergy expenditure and investment that considers this displacement. Having argued for the necessity of exergy as a concept that may complement anti-entropy, I demonstrate that this economy of exergy expenditure, through transductive analogy, can be applied to signification. An economics of exergy may give crucial insight into the transcendental problem of signification; that which Derrida’s notion of différance first responded to. I ask the question: can a trace-like logic of sense be understood energetically if trace itself is understood to be materially inscribed into the world? Having explored this question, I then outline how education might be understood as both the means through with traditional significations are energetically maintained as well as the means through which metastable significations can be disrupted. I use the recent banning of anti-capitalist literature in the UK as an example of what I call logomachics, a conflict of significative exergetic investment and disinvestment. (shrink)

It seems fairly straightforward to describe what should and should not count as a disability into two separate and opposing categories. In this paper we will challenge this assumption and critically reflect on the narrow relations between the concepts of 'talent' and 'disability'. We further relate such matters of terminology and classification to issues of justice in what is conceived of as disability sport. Do current systems of classification do justice to the performances of disabled athletes? Is the organisation of (...) a just and fair competition similar for abled as it is for disabled sport? Two cases (of Francesco Lentini and Oscar Pistorius) will be explored to further illustrate the complexities of these questions, in particular when related to notions of normality and extraordinary performances. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine two versions of the so-called “hierarchical” approach to personal autonomy, based on the notion of “second-order desires”. My primary concern will be with the question of whether these approaches provide an adequate basis for understanding the dynamics of autonomy-ascription. I begin by distinguishing two versions of the hierarchical approach, each representing a different response to the oft-discussed “regress” objection. I then argue that both “structural hierarchicalism” (e.g., Frankfurt, Bratman) and “procedural hierarchicalism” (e.g., Dworkin, Christman, Mele) (...) have difficulties accommodating the dynamics of how the attribution of autonomy to persons is claimed, disputed, and resolved. Although they differ in details, both shortcomings can be traced to viewing autonomy as a metaphysical rather than a normative, practical matter. I conclude by suggesting that these difficulties underscore the advantages of a more constructivist and pragmatist. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the concept of consciousness in C. S. Peirce’s work, revealing how its ways of being are associated with the three Peircean phenomenological categories. In this article, I intend to reflect on the heuristic power of the mind, namely, its ability to bring about new ideas, which, within Peirce’s logic of inquiry, is called by the well-known term of abduction. The abductive logical step promotes a synthesis of signs that constitutes a logical structure capable of proposing a (...) new mediation or representation of a new phenomenon. I make use of a metaphorical passage from Peirce not only to give the title to this essay, but also to highlight the importance of the first category as a sort of synechistic envelopment of an unprecedented logical structure of signs that composes a new synthesis. Two continua intertwine themselves, namely, those of the first and third categories, to account for what appears as a fact of the world in the theater of secondness. The essay also seeks to bring to light the core realism of Peirce’s philosophy, the genetic aspect of this bottomless lake, through its cosmology, where the generalization of forms and the acquisition of habits of reality are the proper ground of his Objective Idealism. One of the heuristic aspect of the lake metaphor is a sort of invitation to extend the concept of synthesis from the realm of logical structures to that one of arts, which in this essay will remain as a suggestion for a further reflection. (shrink)

The qualitative division between domain-general and domain-specific cognition is unsubstantiated. The distinction is instead better viewed as opposites on a gradual scale, which has more explanatory power and fits current empirical evidence better. We also argue that causal cognition may be more general than social learning, which it often involves.

Significant disagreement remains in ethics about the duties we have towards wild animals. This paper aims to mediate those disagreements by exploring how they are supported by, or diverge from, the common-sense ethical principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy and justice popular in medical ethics. We argue that these principles do not clearly justify traditional conservation or a ‘hands-off ’ approach to wild-animal welfare; instead, they support natural negative duties to reduce the harms that we cause as well as natural positive (...) duties to promote the welfare of wild animals. (shrink)

Por mente resiliente, quero dizer a capacidade de toda mente de lidar com a dureza da alteridade, que exige um esforço contínuo para permitir o desenvolvimento de hábitos de conduta. O predicado da resiliência vem da capacidade da mente de se autocorrigir, cada vez que esses hábitos perdem sua eficiência mediativa, exigindo, portanto, a reconstrução de novas mediações cognitivas como hábitos de ação. Neste artigo, proponho refletir sobre o conjunto de interpretantes semióticos proposto por Peirce com o objetivo de explorar (...) sua faceta habitual. Com esta linha de análise, pretendo mostrar que a resiliência é uma propriedade necessária que toda mente deve ter no mais alto grau para lidar com o conflito entre interpretantes emocionais e lógicos, onde a predominância do primeiro em detrimento do segundo pode gerar situações agudas de sofrimento psicológico bloqueando o acesso a representações que, de outra forma, poderiam romper a força bruta da alteridade. (shrink)

A number of results have been obtained concerning Borel structures starting with Silver and Friedman followed by Harrington, Shelah, Marker, and Louveau. Friedman also initiated the model theory of Borel (in fact totally Borel) structures. By this we mean the study of the class of Borel models of a given first-order theory. The subject was further investigated by Steinhorn. The present work is meant to go further in this direction. It is based on the assumption that the study of the (...) class of, say, countable models of a theory reduces to analyzing a single $\omega_1$-saturated model. The question then arises as to when such a model can be totally Borel. We present here a partial answer to this problem when the theory under investigation is superstable. (shrink)

This paper points out the potential of using sport for the analysis of society. Cultivated human movement is a specific social and cultural subsystem, yet it becomes a part of wider social discourses by extending some of its characteristics into various other spheres. This process, theorised as sportification, provides as useful concept to examine the permeation of certain phenomena from the area of sport into the social reality outside of sport. In this paper, we investigate the phenomena of sportification which (...) we parallel with visual culture and spectatorship practices in the Renaissance era. The emphasis in our investigation is on theatricality and performativity; particularly, the superficial spectator engagement with modern sport and sporting spectacles. Unlike the significance afforded to visualisation and deeper symbolic interpretation in Renaissance art, contemporary cultural shifts have changed and challenged the ways in which the active a.. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive collection of critical essays on The Taming of the Shrew, and includes extensive discussions of the play's various printed versions and its theatrical productions. Aspinall has included only those essays that offer the most influential and controversial arguments surrounding the play. The issues discussed include gender, authority, female autonomy and unruliness, courtship and marriage, language and speech, and performance and theatricality.

Might there be knowledge of non-instrumental values? Arguments are give for two principal claims. One is that if there is such knowledge, it typically will have features that do not entirely match those of other kinds of knowledge. It will have a closer relation to the kind of person one is or becomes, and in the way it combines features of knowing-how with knowing-that. There also are problems of indeterminacy of non-instrumental value which are not commonly found in other things (...) that we can know about. The second claim is that there is a strong prima-facie case for holding that there is such knowledge, and that the usual arguments against this are all faulty. (shrink)

According to the standard Aristotelian doctrine of the identity of passion and action (Ipa), a passion and the action with which it is identified are distinguished through a distinction of reason, and both passion and action are located in the patient. Descartes has recently been interpreted by some scholars to be rejecting Ipa in favor of a view that throws into contention a dualistic interpretation of his philosophy of mind. This article contends that Descartes did hold Ipa, albeit expressed in (...) his own metaphysical vocabulary of substance and mode. On this interpretation, (1) a passion and the action with which it is identified are distinguished through a conceptual distinction or distinction of reason and (2) the passion and the action constitute one and the same mode which is locatedin the patient. This result is significant first, because it shows Descartes's retention of a fundamentally Aristotelian understanding of the metaphysical categories of passion and action and second, because it removes some of the support for recent interpretations on which Descartes is seen in the Passions of the Soul to diverge from a dualistic view of mind and body. (shrink)

A Estética, uma das ciências normativas da filosofia de Peirce, não tem por objeto o Belo, mas o Admirável, como sabem os estudiosos de sua obra. Contudo, não é imediatamente evidente essa distinção, uma vez que Admirabilidade traz em seu interior o predicado da beleza também. Quais, então, seriam as relações entre ambos esses conceitos? Por que a admirabilidade se credenciaria a ser um fim em si mesma da Estética e se constituir no fim último da Ética? Qual a natureza (...) da experiência estética e como ela pode subsidiar a identificação do que seja o Admirável? Partindo da insistência de que há uma rede de conceitos na filosofia de Peirce, da Fenomenologia à sua Metafísica, que fornece um rico vocabulário para se refletir sobre tais questões, esse ensaio busca mostrar que há na natureza epistemológica do pragmaticismo uma eticidade que embora seja necessária não lhe é suficiente, requerendo-se que a Estética forneça os fins das ações que constituem revelação dos conceitos, à luz das categorias peircianas consideradas estruturantes das relações entre mundos interno e externo, tomados sob uma ótica radicalmente realista. (shrink)

The conceptual axis of this paper is a reflection on Charles Peirce’s realism, trying to show it as the ground from which many others of his philosophical doctrines are derived. In its first part, the paper analyses the problems posed by the classical Peircean paper Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man, proposing to extract from the consequences of this analysis the guidelines of a realism that gradually become more radical in Peirce’s mature work. Such consequences will be consolidated in (...) his Phenomenology, a science that will ground Semiotics and a conception of symmetry related to Peirce’s categories. This symmetry regarding his epistemology and ontology will be, by the way, omnipresent in all Peircean philosophical system. The second part of the paper discusses the concepts of mediation and representation, also under a realistic background, concluding that these concepts cannot be coherently interlaced in nominalistic philosophies, in which is often found theoretical consequences somehow committed with dogmatic and no dialogic postures, in the sense of a meaning analysis proposed by the classical Peircean pragmatism. (shrink)

Chancengleichheit ist ein viel komplexeres Ideal als gemeinhzin angenommen. Das Ideal lässt sich weder auf einen streng egalitären Standard reduzieren, noch kann es als bloss prozedurale oder bloss substantielle Forderung aufgefasst werden. Diese Untersuchung zeigt, wie das Ideal zu verstehen ist und welche Funktion ihm im philosophischen Liberalismus zukommen sollte. Chancengleichheit hat im Liberalismus allerdings eine viel geringere Bedeutung als Politik und Philosophie glauben machen.

Nachhaltige Entwicklung, Klimaschutz oder der Kampf gegen den Verlust von Biodiversität verlangen politische Entscheide, die langfristig sind und in die Zukunft weisen. Solche Entscheide belasten aber häufig die Bürgerinnen und Bürger von heute. Deshalb laufen Demokratien Gefahr, langfristigen Massnahmen auszuweichen. Dies liegt an ihrer institutionellen Struktur. Cite as: Wallimann-Helmer, Ivo (2020): Institutionen einer Nachhaltigen Demokratie, in: Bulletin der Schweizerischen Akademie der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften 26,3, S. 33–36.

Die Klimakrise, der Biodiversitätsverlust und viele weitere ökologische Herausforderungen verlangen sofortiges politisches Handeln. Doch die meisten Staaten – auch Demokratien – hinken den notwendigen Maßnahmen hinterher. In Demokratien wäre unter Umständen eine Lösung des Problems, Heranwachsende zu Umweltbürger:innen auszubilden. Dieser Aufsatz zeigt, weshalb eine solche Bildungsmaßnahme aus dem liberalen Gerechtigkeitsparadigma heraus nur schwer gerechtfertigt werden kann. Problematisch ist, dass viele Vorschläge zur Reform demokratischer Institutionen zugunsten von mehr Nachhaltigkeit Nachhaltigkeits-Kompetenzen zur Voraussetzung für die Beteiligung an denselben machen. Sie riskieren Gleichheit (...) und Freiheit als Grundwerte liberaler Demokratie zu untergraben. Wir können deshalb legitimerweise nur auf die selbständige Ausbildung der nötigen Tugenden unter den Bürger:innen hoffen. (shrink)

Ought Implies Kant defends Kantianism via a critical examination of consequentialism. The latter is shown to be untenable on epistemic grounds; meanwhile, the charge that Kantianism is really consequentialism in disguise is refuted. The book also presents a novel interpretation of Kantianism as according direct duties owed to other animals.

In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that insists upon the (...) requirement that beliefs be truth conducive and another that insists that they be epistemically responsible. It will then, on his view, be possible to properly evaluate beliefs with regard to each conception of justification. Riggs, however, is mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are independent. If a belief is responsibly arrived at, it is therefore likely to be true. He is thus also mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are incompatible. This mistake arises because Riggs assumes that justification is possible or, at least, that it involves standards that are akin to our own. Moreover, once this assumption is made explicit, we can see why a notion of justification that connects epistemic practice with likely truth is significant. (shrink)

The Expression of Emotion collects cutting-edge essays on emotional expression written by leading philosophers, psychologists, and legal theorists. It highlights areas of interdisciplinary research interest, including facial expression, expressive action, and the role of both normativity and context in emotion perception. Whilst philosophical discussion of emotional expression has addressed the nature of expression and its relation to action theory, psychological work on the topic has focused on the specific mechanisms underpinning different facial expressions and their recognition. Further, work in both (...) legal and political theory has had much to say about the normative role of emotional expressions, but would benefit from greater engagement with both psychological and philosophical research. In combining philosophical, psychological, and legal work on emotional expression, the present volume brings these distinct approaches into a productive conversation. (shrink)

This book presents classical philosophical sources on value as well as readings that show how this concept shapes central issues and domains of economics, culture and knowledge, thus shedding a light on a key concept of the globalized work.

Depue & Collins's model of incentive-motivational modulation of goal-directed behavior subserved by a medial orbital prefrontal cortical (MOC) network is appealing, but it leaves several questions unanswered: How are the stimuli that elicit an incentive motivational state selected? How does the incentive motivational state created by the MOC network modulate behavior? What is the function of the dopaminergic input to the striatum? This commentary suggests possible answers, based on the open-interconnected model of basal-ganglia-thalamocortical circuits, in which the limbic circuit selects (...) goals and, via its connections with the motor and the associative circuits, directs behavior according to those goals, elaborating on the role of dopamine. (shrink)

Among Digitized Manuscripts: Philology, Codicology, Paleography in a Digital World. By L. W. C. van Lit. Handbook of Oriental Studies, I, vol. 137. Leiden: Brill, 2020. Pp. xi + 333. $150, €125, open access: https://brill.com/view/title/56196.

Those who advance the traditional argument from human freedom presume that human freedom provides an adequate explanation of moral evil. I argue that this presumption is erroneous. An adequate explanation of our capacity to make choices that produce moral evil must be distinguished from an adequate explanation of the actuality of such choices. Human freedom may account for our ability to make choices that issue in moral evil. It cannot, by itself, account for our actually making such choices. Something more (...) than our potential for choices that produce moral evil is required to adequately explain the profusion of moral evil that we actually find in the world. (shrink)

Clearing philosophical ground for diagnoses of the contemporary ‘post-truth’-problematic, this article discusses the systematic and ineliminable ambivalence of claims to truth in public discourse and collective life generally, where truth cannot ultimately be disentangled from untruth. Truth becomes a problem in the relevant sense only where matters are morally-existentially charged, so that acknowledging truth threatens, e.g., loss of self-respect, and self-deception becomes tempting, individually and collectively. To the extent that our life is marked by injustice and destructiveness, it is necessarily (...) also marked by systematic falsification, a conspiracy to deny the truth about it, about us. Collective life exhibits pervasive hostility to interpersonal (moral) understanding, which is repressed through collectively established fake ‘understandings’ and regimes of respectability. The fact/opinion and fact/value distinctions function as defences against understanding, while meaning and truth are seen as things to be determined rather than understood, and the concept of representatability, how things can be made to appear, becomes central. However, standard philosophical views on truth, meaning and morality render the problematic sketched here invisible, because they effectively move – as Wittgenstein arguably realised – wholly within the collective perspective that needs to be problematised. Keywords: moral understanding, self-deception, collective life, representation, conspiracy theories, political corrrectness. (shrink)